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Abstract
The Spanish justice system has been shaken by the econom-
ic downturn as many other institutions have. This article
addresses in the first place some statistical data that shed
light as regards to the number of judges and the costs and
length of the procedure in Spain. These figures help to
understand, in the second place, the impact of austerity
measures on the judiciary, namely, the freeze on the hiring
of judges and the establishing of high court fees. While they
mainly concern the supply side of justice services, others
such cost reductions in legal aid have had, in the third place,
an impact on the demand side, driving many citizens to
social exclusion and to resorting to self-defence mecha-
nisms. The final part of this article addresses some remedies
that may alleviate judiciary’s workload, but that fall short of
doing it. All in all, the Spanish justice system seems to
require a holistic approach to patch up edges, but one in
which the role of judge-made justice in a democratic society
has to be central again.
Keywords: judiciary, judge-made justice, court fees, legal
aid, ADR-methods
1 Introduction
Spain has not only experienced the global economic
downturn, but also a crisis on its own, mainly stemming
from the malfunction of its housing market. The age of
austerity is thus not a metaphor, but a reality when it
comes to this country and to its justice system. The lat-
ter has experienced significant budget restrictions, but
more importantly, its capability to solve social conflict
has been put through a very hard test during these
years, delivering intermingled results and a profound
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dissatisfaction on the citizen side;1 while the supply side
of justice services shrank as a result of budget reduc-
tions, the demand side escalated as a consequence of the
economic downturn as well as legal problems indirectly
unveiled by it and that would have been better served by
a legal and not a judicial solution. In short, the common
understanding in Spain is that the judiciary is the ulti-
mate guarantee of democracy, but its organisation and
functioning are not in line with the needs of a modern
society.2
This article does not seek to propose any reform, but to
provide an account of the impact of the economic down-
turn in the Spanish civil justice system. To this end, the
territorial organisation of Spain must be taken into
account. Along with the Central State, the Comunidades
Autónomas have also legislative and governmental pow-
ers, but not the judicial one as there is only one judiciary
in the whole territory, governed by a General Coun-
cil, the Consejo General del Poder Judicial (hereafter,
CGPJ).3 Hence, the budget of the justice system is
mainly decided by the Spanish Parliament. However,
some administrative competencies have been transferred
to the Comunidades Autónomas such as the allocation of
material resources to courts and the hiring of support
staff save the case of court clerks who are deemed part
of the judiciary and recruited by the Central Govern-
ment. Furthermore, the European Union has also a role
to play on account of the many Regulations and Direc-
tives dealing with access to justice and that are applica-
ble in Spain; remarkably, the right to an efficient reme-
1. The degree of absolute dissatisfaction with the justice system has been
constantly increasing since 2005 where 19.8% of participants in a bar-
ometer conducted by the Spanish Centre on Sociological Research (CIS
– Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas) answered that they were not
satisfied with the system at all; in 2014 that percentage was 38.4%. In
contrast, those taking part in the same barometer and answering to be
only a little bit satisfied with the justice system remain steady, from
39.4 % in 2005 to 40% in 2014. These figures have been gathered in a
statistical publication entitled ‘La percepción de los ciudadanos sobre la
Administración de Justicia’ (N.38, Diciembre 2014), available at <www.
poderjudicial. es/ cgpj/ es/ Temas/ Estadistica -Judicial/ Analisis -estadistico/
Datos -de -la -Justicia/ La -percepcion -de -los -ciudadanos -sobre -la -
Administracion -de -Justicia - -N -38 - -Diciembre -2014 ->.
2. The Spanish Council of Bar Associations, or Consejo General de la Abo-
gacía Española (hereafter, CGAE), has published on 8 July 2015 a bar-
ometer on lawyers’ opinion, among others, on this issue, and 92% of
participants agree that it is necessary to reach a State Pact to reform the
justice system. See Figure 3.5 available at <www. abogacia. es/ wp -
content/ uploads/ 2012/ 05/ INFORME -GENERAL -BAROMETRO -
INTERNO -CGAE -JULIO -2015. pdf>.
3. In addition to the Spanish Constitution, the key law is that on the judi-
cial power or Ley Orgánica 5/1985, de 5 de julio, del Poder Judicial
(hereafter, LOPJ).
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dy before a tribunal is enshrined in Article 47 of the
European Charter of Fundamental Rights. Be as it may
be, the Spanish justice system provides relief in small
and simple matters in the age of austerity,4 but a num-
ber of measures has been taken, or not been undertaken,
that have clearly downgraded the system in the last
years.
The justice system has never been a priority for most
countries and Spain is not an exception. Nevertheless,
many efforts have been made to improve the system in
the last thirty years, in particular in terms of increasing
judicial staff. Along with the political interest in
appointing judges already educated in constitutional
values, such an investment has been justified on the
grounds of Spain falling largely behind other European
countries in number of judges.5 In fact, these low fig-
ures seem to be endemic despite the said efforts as it is
addressed in the second part of this article which aims to
provide a picture of the civil justice system in terms not
only of the number of judges, but also of the length and
average costs of proceedings. Those figures seem to be
necessary to properly assess the impact of budget
restrictions in the justice system.
The third part of this article addresses the budget
restrictions undertaken by the Government on the
grounds of austerity, both with a clear impact on the
judiciary’s workload and thus on access to justice, i.e.
the freeze in hiring judges and support staff, and the
generalisation of high court fees. While this part of the
article focuses on austerity in the justice administration,
i.e. the supply side, the fourth part puts emphasis on the
demand side and thus on the impact of austerity meas-
ures in citizens by dealing, first, with the fragile situa-
tion of legal aid in Spain and second with the resorting
to self-defence mechanisms experienced in Spain in
view of the lack of activism to solve crucial problems.
The Spanish judiciary is not responsible of such reac-
tions, yet they have unveiled that in the twenty-first
century, courts cannot restrict themselves to be the
mouth that pronounces the words of law, but they have
to take on a more proactive role providing meaningful
solutions to real problems.
The last part of this article is devoted to mechanisms
that can give relief to an important number of citizens
and, thus, discharge the justice system of many cases. In
general, the Spanish civil procedure law system is well
4. On this concept see X. E. Kramer and S. Kakiuchi, ‘Relief in Small and
Simple Matters in an Age of Austerity’, at 7 (25 May 2015), available at
SSRN: <http:// ssrn. com/ abstract= 2610773>. Small and simple matters
is also an open concept in Spain, but one that can be fulfilled by making
reference to verbal proceedings’ scope of application. In addition to
ordinary proceedings, the Spanish Civil Procedure Act, Ley 1/2000 de
Enjuiciamiento Civil (hereafter LEC), provides for a simplified proceed-
ing called procedimiento verbal in cases under 6,000 € value and others
expressly indicated by law and in particular in Art. 250 LEC on the
grounds of requiring a prompt solution.
5. See The 2014 EU Justice Scoreboard. Communication from the Com-
mission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Central
Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Commit-
tee of the Regions [COM(2014) 155 final], Figure 27, available at
<http:// ec. europa. eu/ justice/ effective -justice/ files/ justice_ scoreboard_
2014_ en. pdf>.
provided of mechanisms which facilitate access to jus-
tice. Small and simple matters find their way into courts
via simplified proceedings – in which legal assistance of
a lawyer is not always compulsory – and others such as
the order for payment procedure by summons or con-
sumer collective actions. Consumer arbitration adminis-
tered by the State has been made available for consumer
matters as well. In fact, the Government has justified
the aforementioned high court fees on the grounds of
the alternative dispute resolution methods available for
citizens. Nevertheless and without questioning the need
for promoting such methods, policies seeking to dis-
charge courts of cases are of secondary interest to the
primary one, of granting citizens access to a judge-made
justice. The point to be made is that hampering access
to justice cannot be justified by the availability of ADR
mechanisms, thereby forgetting that the State shall
guarantee the aforementioned right of each citizen to an
effective and timely judicial review.
2 A Statistical Picture of the
Spanish Civil Justice System
2.1 Length of Litigation and Average Number of
Judges
In line with the General Report for the XV World Con-
gress of Procedural Law presented by Xandra Kramer
and Shusuke Kakiuchi on Relief in Small and Simple
Matters,6 the following data focus on the Spanish civil
justice system and are taken from the statistics yearly
provided by the CGPJ.7 They show the number of civil
courts, the number of incoming cases and caseload in
different stages of the proceedings, as well as the length
of the procedure.
The civil justice system is organised in 431 judicial dis-
tricts with 895 single judge courts, including courts of
first instance (a few of them specialised in family mat-
ters in big cities and others also in charge of criminal
enquiries in some small cities) and commercial courts,
and 95 collegiate bodies, i.e. provincial high courts with
a civil chamber, superior courts of justice with a civil
and criminal chamber, and the Supreme Court whose
first chamber is devoted to civil matters. The number of
judges is 3,999, although the figure includes all judges
dealing with civil and criminal matters. All in all, the
percentage of members of the judiciary per 100,000
inhabitants is 11.5.
In 2014 civil courts handled 1,845,173 incoming cases,
resolved 1,858,579 cases, and left pending 1,009,392
cases, and 484,751 judgments were pronounced. As to
enforcement of judgments, in 2014 civil courts received
621,226 incoming cases, resolved 595,691 cases, and left
2,023,465 cases pending at the end of the year. Howev-
er, these data have been heavily criticised on account of
6. Kramer and Kakiuchi, above n. 4.
7. See The Spanish Judiciary in Figures 2014. Judicial Statistics, available
at <www. poderjudicial. es>.
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the planning and design survey.8 Noteworthy is that the
abovementioned data label as ‘incoming cases’ all type of
proceedings – including those ancillary to others such as
incidental proceedings or provisional measures; appeals,
cassation, and other challenges; or even payment pro-
ceedings that end up in a declaratory one – so that the
same case counts more than once.9 The point made by
this criticism is worth being pursued to the extent that
an inappropriate design survey does not provide a real
picture of the Spanish justice system, i.e. of which are
the weak points and, thus, of how to solve them. While
this study goes back to 2013, nothing has changed in the
CGPJ’s modus operandi since then.
In a similar vein, it is not easy to calculate the real
length of the procedure due to the lack of accurate stat-
istical official information. According to the same source
provided by the CGPJ, the length of the procedure in
courts of first instance was about 7.3 months in 2009,
but descended abruptly in 2014 to 6.2 months. In com-
mercial courts such a length is much longer and has
been steadily growing from 20.3 months in 2009 to 40
months in 2014. As to the second instance, the average
duration is around 6 months for the same period.10
Even with all abovementioned caveats, these figures jus-
tify the need of more judges in Spain and provide the
background against which to assess the measures under-
taken by the Government in the age of austerity and
that are examined in the third part of this article. But
there may be more reasons behind the length of the pro-
cedure and one of them could be the amount of paper to
be handled by courts. While important steps have been
taken to implement the information technology in the
system,11 the digitalisation of procedure has been literal-
ly patchy in Spain due to the fact that each Comunidad
Autónoma applies a telematic system. Coordination
depends on the Central Government and Action Plans
have been issued with this goal in task, but the issue has
not been completely solved yet.
2.2 Average Costs of Civil Procedure
The more expensive, the more difficult is to get access
to justice. In order to assess other measures undertaken
in the age of austerity, a brief reference to the average
costs of civil procedure in Spain, which are very varia-
ble, seems to be necessary. The amount is usually
around the 10% of the economic interest of the proce-
dure, but in cases in which subject matters of less than
8. See Report on the resorting to, and elaboration of, statistics by the
CGPJ, prepared by the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid in 2013 and
published by the CGAE, available at <www. abogacia. es/ 2013/ 07/ 24/
situacion -actual -de -la -administracion -de -justicia -en -espana -un -analisis -
desde -el -derecho -procesal/>.
9. According to this study, only around 700,000 cases could be labeled as
‘incoming cases’, once all abovementioned duplicities are avoided.
10. These data can be contrasted with those provided by the 2014 EU Jus-
tice Scoreboard, above n. 5, Figure 2.
11. The Organic Law 16/1994, of 8 November, amending the LOPJ,
already provided the legal basis to modernise the justice system being
now key to this end, Law 18/2011, of 5 July, on the use of the informa-
tion and communication technology in the justice administration (BOE
No. 160, 6.7.2011).
10,000 € are discussed, the costs may be around
2,000-5,000 €.12
The Spanish system is organised according to the prin-
ciple ‘the loser pays’, whereas the ‘winner’ does not take
it all, but a big part of the costs. That includes lawyers
and procuradore’ fees; costs linked to proofs such as
experts’ and notaries’ fees, copies, certifications, etcet-
era; and court fees, deposits to challenge judgments,
payments for announcements or public announcements,
preventive annotations of lawsuits or embargos, deposits
of goods, etcetera. However, other costs are not recover-
able from the litigant who loses, i.e. pre-trial costs such
as previous legal advice, extra-procedural activities,
costs to gather proofs, and any other payments related
to the proceedings.
Noteworthy is that lawyers’ and procuradores’ fees are
only recoverable if their participation in the proceedings
is mandatory, which is otherwise the rule in Spain. One
exception is that of litigation of small matters through
simplified proceedings provided that the claim is under
2,000 €. Other exceptions where the assistance of a law-
yer is not mandatory concern particular actuations,
namely, the initial application for an order for payment,
the application for taking part in proceedings already
initiated, or requesting urgent measures before the
beginning of proceedings or the urgent suspension of a
hearing or particular events.13
In addition to a lawyer, parties to proceedings need a
procurador. Related to the personero named in Las Parti-
das by Alfonso X ‘the Wise’ in the twelfth century and
to the procurator of Roman Law, the procurador de los tri-
bunales has been legally representing individuals in court
ever since, playing a complementary role to the lawyers’
tasks of providing clients with legal advice and
defence.14 Anyway, parties to a civil proceeding must be
represented by a procurador along with a lawyer save
some cases as well,15 namely, simplified proceedings
dealing with claims under 2,000 € and specific actua-
tions, such as the initial application for an order for pay-
ment; claim filing or participation in meetings in the
framework of universal proceedings; provision for legal
aid; or those cases in which urgent measures are reques-
ted before the commencement of the proceedings.
Despite these fees, the standardisation of procedure
with the aim of cost reduction does not seem to be on
the legal agenda,16 and standard forms are being resor-
ted to in just very specific cases. For example, a debtor
natural person that intends to apply for a debt discharge
is advised to fill in a standard form to request negotia-
tions to reach an out-of-court restructuring plan and to
12. These figures are only indicative. They have been concluded in particu-
lar taking into account the guidelines on lawyers’ fees provided by bar
associations and available at their webpages.
13. See Art. 31 LEC.
14. In the Middle Age its role was similar to the barristers’ in English Law,
but it evolved very differently along the centuries as it was little by little
perceived as a subject whose task was only that of assisting lawyers,
mostly being in charge of obtaining notices and summons for their cli-
ents and meeting legal deadlines.
15. See Art. 23 LEC.
16. See on this trend Kramer and Kakiuchi, above n. 4, at 50.
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provide the lists of her assets and liabilities.17 Apart
from other exceptional cases, standard forms are mostly
linked in Spain to the application of European Regula-
tions.
3 Budget Restrictions on the
Grounds of the Economic
Downturn
3.1 The Freeze on the Hiring of Judges
Unlike other countries where becoming a judge is the
culmination of a successful professional career, the
Spanish system requires applicants to pass qualifying
exams that require extensive preparation and afterwards
undergo a training period at a corporate school. Accord-
ingly, becoming a judge is a long process in Spain, but
one which is mostly undertaken by young bachelors: the
average time of preparation is 4.5 years after getting the
law degree while the training period lasts for a year,
being 30 years old the average age to become a judge.18
Noteworthy is that most of them have not worked
before and those that have were not employed in the law
field.
Legal professionals such as lawyers with more than 10
years of practice may become judges passing a specific
examination, but the abovementioned open competition
is the usual door to enter into the judicial career. The
latter has been largely contended on the grounds of
mostly relying on a rote-learning approach to ensure
that those selected meet the principles of merit and
capability as required by the Spanish Constitution19 and
thus disregarding other abilities that a judge must have.
Nevertheless, the debate between supporters and oppo-
nents has only led to a minor modification of the open
competition,20 by including the arguing and solving
cases to show know-how and not only knowledge.21
Other changes have been proposed and were under dis-
cussion when the economic downturn broke out in
Spain. They focused on the socio-economic origin of
applicants acknowledging the fact that applicants have
17. This possibility is available only to debtors’ natural persons with liabili-
ties under 5 mil. € and legal persons that may resort to the fast-track
procedure laid down in Art. 190 of the Law 22/2003, of 9 July, on
Insolvency, the Ley Concursal (hereafter, LC). The use of standard
forms is laid down in Art. 232(2) thereof.
18. Data are from 2003 to 2014 and taken from statistics provided by the
CGPJ available at <www. poderjudicial. es>.
19. Art. 103(3) of the Spanish Constitution establishes that both principles
are at the core of access to the judiciary being then further developed in
Arts. 301 ff. LOPJ.
20. See as examples of these contradictory viewpoints G. Quintero Oli-
vares, ‘Judges and Prosecutors, between selection and recruitment’, 3
Education and Law Review (2011), available at <http:// revistes. ub. edu/
index. php/ RED/ article/ view/ 1778/ 2349> and J. Jaria i Manzano,
‘Selection, Professional Profile and Initial Training of Judges in Spain’, 3
Education and Law Review (2011), available at <http:// revistes. ub. edu/
index. php/ RED/ article/ view/ 1780/ 2353>.
21. As mentioned by the White Book on Justice edited by the CGPJ in
1998. Available at <www. icam. es/ docs/ ficheros/ 201202170003_ 6_ 0.
pdf>.
to study for a long period during which they do not earn
any money; this has an impact on future judges’ back-
ground to the extent that not all social classes and thus
not all sensibilities are represented in the judiciary.
Against this background, it is to highlight that the Span-
ish Constitution does not only lay down the principle of
equality and the prohibition of any kind of discrimina-
tion, but also the obligation to promote the necessary
conditions to make it feasible.22 Accordingly, the estab-
lishing of a grant system has been discussed in recent
years,23 but unfortunately, it has never gone beyond this
stage, due to the economic downturn among other rea-
sons.24
Anyway, Spain has made a great effort to improve and
modernise the judicial system in the last 30 years,
including a relevant increase of the number of judges.
Taking into account the abovementioned usual mode of
becoming a judge, the need of incentivising applicants
has also played a role in this, and a significant offer of
judge positions has been made on a yearly basis for
almost 20 years.25 Despite this, the number of judges in
Spain is still a low one compared to other countries in
Europe. According to data provided by the CGPJ in
2014, there are 11.5 judges per 100,000 inhabitants,
while the European rate is 19.8. In fact, the economic
downturn broke down the efforts already made to over-
come this gap to the extent that one of the austerity
measures adopted by the Government was the freeze of
public employment. Accordingly, while 400 judge posi-
tions were offered in 2010 and 2011, there was no call
for applications in 2012 and only 100 positions were
offered in the years 2013 and 2014.26 Furthermore, the
hiring of substitute or deputy judges to cover temporary
vacancies of professional judges has been stopped as
well.
Noteworthy is that last statistics provided by the CGPJ
showed a slight increase in the abovementioned rate in
22. See Arts. 14 and 9(2) of the Spanish Constitution, respectively.
23. See for all, M.J. Collado Nuño, ‘Access to the Judicial Career in Spain’, 3
Education and Law Review 1, at 4 (2010). Available at <http:// revistes.
ub. edu/ index. php/ RED/ article/ view/ 1777/ 1762>.
24. Other issues have been totally disregarded during these years being
noteworthy the lack of attention to the impact of the Bologna system in
Spanish legal education. As known, the Bologna Declaration promotes a
system made of a bachelor degree and a master. Spain follows now this
system, but only one professional master has been set up, by which
entry to the legal professions of lawyer and procurador de los tribunales
has been regulated. The case of judges has not been targeted yet,
despite acknowledgment of this issue. See F. Galindo Ayuda, ‘La forma-
ción de los jueces’, 7896 Diario La Ley (2012), available at <http://
diariolaley. laley. es>, and in particular ‘El CGPJ abre el debate sobre el
acceso a la carrera judicial y se plantea solicitar que los opositores sean
máster’, 7551 Diario La Ley (2011), available at <http:// diariolaley.
laley. es>. See discussing this issue L. Carballo Piñeiro, ‘Legal Education
in Spain: Challenges and Risks in Devising Access to the Legal Profes-
sions’, 19 International Journal of the Legal Profession 339, at 347
(2012).
25. According to Art. 306 LOPJ, a call for application is to be made at least
each 2 years. Since 1998, the call for applications is made on a yearly
basis.
26. Mort recent calls for applications are available at <www. poderjudicial.
es>.
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relation to that in 2013.27 The reasons have to be found
in the loss of population undergone by Spain as a result
of the economic downturn while a considerable number
of legal persons has disappeared.28 In a similar vein,
legal reforms are shifting some competencies from judg-
es to other legal professionals.29 While some of them can
be contended, the number of cases to be handled by
Spanish judges accordingly diminishes. Nevertheless,
what cannot be contended is that public investment in
justice has been dramatically reduced, from 90 € inhabi-
tant/year in 2010 to 25 € in 2012.30 And it is only this
year that a slight increase in the budget has been prom-
ised.
3.2 The Establishing of Court Fees
Court fees were totally abolished in Spain in 198631 in
accordance with a wide interpretation of the principle of
freedom from costs laid down in the Spanish Constitu-
tion.32 In 2002 they were reintroduced, but only for
legal persons and in the framework of civil and adminis-
trative proceedings,33 thereby setting aside natural per-
sons. However, they were extended to every user of the
judicial system in 2013 on the grounds that access to
justice is a service and those interested in using it have
to pay for it.34 In fact, the Explanatory Introduction to
Law 10/2012 by which they were established makes it
clear that court fees are determined taking into account
the costs of providing justice and not the economic
capability of the tax payer, the latter being in contradic-
tion with the principle of economic capability enshrined
by the Spanish Constitution.35
Court fees were made up of a fixed36 and a variable
quantity, the latter consisting of a percentage applicable
27. From 11, 1 judges per 100,000 inhabitants in 2013 to 11, 5 in 2014.
See The Spanish Judiciary in figures 2013, at 13. Available at <www.
poderjudicial. es>.
28. See Report on the resorting to and elaboration of statistics by the CGPJ,
prepared by the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid in 2013 and publish-
ed by the EU Justice Scoreboard, above n. 7, at 6 contending that litiga-
tion has returned to 2007 figures.
29. See on further problems concerning the court office J. Nieva Fenoll,
‘Reformas pasadas y reformas pendientes del proceso civil español’,
8513 Diario La Ley 1 (2015).
30. Both data are taken from The 2014 EU Justice Scoreboard, above n. 5,
at 22 and 23.
31. See Law 25/1986, of 24 December (BOE No. 313, 31.12.1986).
32. Art. 119 of the Spanish Constitution.
33. Ley 53/2002, de 30 de diciembre, de Medidas Fiscales, Administrativas
y del Orden Social (BOE No. 313, 31.12.2002).
34. See Ley 10/2012, de 20 de noviembre, por la que se regulan determi-
nadas tasas en el ámbito de la Administración de Justicia y del Instituto
Nacional de Toxicología y Ciencias Forenses (en adelante Ley de
Tasas), desarrollada por la Orden HAP/2662/2012, de 13 de diciembre
(BOE No. 280, 21.11.2012).
35. See Art. 31(1) of the Spanish Constitution. Another issue was that taxa-
ble events were not clearly determined in Law 10/2012 giving rise to
legal uncertainty. On both grounds, the Government issued immediate-
ly after the entry into force of Law 10/2012, Royal Decree Law 3/2013,
of 23 February (BOE No. 47, 23.2.2013), amending the calculation of
court fees to be paid by individuals and some aspects of the Law
1/1996, of 10 January, on Legal Aid (Ley de Asistencia Jurídica Gratui-
ta) with a view to line up both laws. See criticism by C. Martínez Sán-
chez, ‘Una aproximación crítica a las tasas judiciales desde el derecho
financiero y tributario’, 27 Revista Jurídica de la Universidad Autónoma
de Madrid 205 (2013).
over the claim’s quantity.37 Second and third instances
were far more expensive than the first one to the extent
that only the fixed part of the fee amounted to 800 € in
case of an appeal and to 1200 € in case of cassation. As a
matter of fact, the impact of these high court fees was
especially clear in the access to the second instance put-
ting in question the right to appeal. In general, the
reform discouraged individuals from resorting to courts
and endangered effective access to justice,38 for which
reason the reform was challenged before the Constitu-
tional Court.39 While court fees are not in principle
against any constitutional right, it all depends on wheth-
er they impair access to justice due to their high
amount.40 And when assessing these fees, it must be tak-
en into account that the minimum salary in Spain is
648.80 € per month.41
Bar associations and lawyers were very active against
court fees as civil society was against them: a survey of
27 November 2012 founded by the CGAE concluded
that 83% of the Spanish society was against it.42 On the
grounds of the general discontent, the Government
finally amended Law 10/2012;43 while court fees for
legal persons are maintained, a significant number of
exclusions have been laid down on both objective44 and
36. See Art. 7 of Law 10/2012. The fixed part of the fee was the following:
simplified and summary procedures, 150 €; ordinary procedure, 300 €;
orders for payment procedures and claims in the framework of insol-
vency proceedings, 100 €; extrajudicial enforcement and opposition to
judicial enforcement, 200 €; mandatory insolvency proceedings, 200 €;
appeal, 800 €; cassation, 1200 €.
37. In case of individuals the variable part of the court fee was 0.10% over
the value of the claim, with a maximum of 2,000 €. In case of legal per-
sons, from 0 to 1,000,000 € that percentage is 0.5% and from that
quantity on, 0.25%. The maximum of this variable part of court fees is
10,000 €.
38. Judicial statistics confirms that court fees discouraged access to justice,
their impact being particularly relevant when it comes to challenging a
judgment. In 2013 the number of incoming cases before courts of first
instance was 12.0% less than in 2012 while that figure before Provin-
cial High Courts-Civil Division (dealing with appeals) was 20.2% less
than in 2012, and a 15.5% less before High Courts, 1st Chamber. See
Judicial Statistics, above n. 7, at 41 and A. Egea de Haro, ‘Una aproxi-
mación al efecto de las tasas sobre el nivel de litigiosidad. Placebo y
realidad’, 8498 Diario La Ley 1, at 5 (2015).
39. See questions of constitutionality No. 5173-2013, No. 1628/2013, No.
5438-2013, and No. 905/2014; and constitutionality challenges No.
973-2013 and No. 1024-2013, No. 4948-2013, and No. 4972-2013.
40. See judgment of the Constitutional Court 20/2012, of 16 February, and
F. Álvarez-Ossorio Micheo, ‘Tasas judiciales: entre principio de propor-
cionalidad y política de derechos humanos’, 100 Revista Española de
Derecho Constitucional 221(2014). Remarkable is the decision taken by
some courts of not applying the court fee on the grounds of the liti-
gant’s economic situation and the rights at stake, as it happens in the
case decided by Auto de la Audiencia Provincial Pontevedra, 20 July
2014, available at <www. poderjudicial. es/ cgpj/ es/ Poder -Judicial/ Sala -
de -Prensa/ Notas -de -prensa/ -La -Audiencia -de -Pontevedra -exime -a -un -
recurrente -de -pagar -la -tasa -judicial -por -considerarla -inaplicable>.
41. See Royal Decree 1106/2014, of 26 December (BOE No. 313,
27.12.2014), fixing an inter-professional minimum salary for 2015.
42. Available at <www. abogacia. es/ wp -content/ uploads/ 2012/ 11/ METRO
SCOPIA -INFORME -TASAS. pdf>.
43. Royal-Decree 1/2015, of 27 February (BOE No. 51, 28.2.2015).
44. They are enumerated in Art. 4(1) of Law 10/2012, including the
request for voluntary bankruptcy by the debtor, or initial request for a
payment order procedure and demand in the verbal proceeding when
the amount thereof do not exceed 2,000 €.
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subjective45 grounds. Noteworthy is that natural per-
sons are now excluded from the payment of court fees.
4 The Impact of Austerity
Measures
4.1 The Situation of Legal Aid and the Exclusion
of Litigants from the System
The right to legal aid is constitutionally acknowledged
in Spain and further regulated by Law 1/1996.46 Legal
aid covers all kind of procedures, including legal advice
prior to the commencement of a proceeding. While this
right can be claimed by any Spanish and EU citizen,47
foreign citizens may apply for it only when residing in
Spain, save some international treaties. Some legal per-
sons are also granted legal aid when it comes to specific
claims, such as consumer associations with a view to
bringing collective actions before courts or in general,
foundations and associations serving public interests.
In order to get legal aid, applicants must basically meet
two requirements,48 namely, litigating on own matters
and lacking resources to litigate. Applicant’s economic
resources are measured according to an indicator regula-
ted by Royal Decree Law 3/2013; while the maximum
income per month was twice the minimum wage, the
latter has been substituted by the so-called public reve-
nue index which has been growing at a lower rate than
the minimum wage, making it difficult for families in
difficulties to get access to legal aid. Furthermore, it
must be borne in mind that this index remains ‘frozen’
since 2010.49 The income of the applicant must be less
than twice this index when the family consists of only
one person, two and a half when there are less than four
family members, and three times in case they are more
than four. While the general rule is that the right to
legal aid is allocated according to the economic situation
of applicants, a flexible mechanism of subjective appre-
ciation has been established, allowing the exceptional
recognition of the right to those whose economic resour-
45. Pursuant to Art. 4(2) of Law 10/2012, exemptions on subjective
grounds are the following: (a) natural persons; (b) legal persons who
have been granted the right to legal aid; (c) the Public Ministry; (d) the
General State Administration, the Autonomous Regions, local authori-
ties, and the employees of all public bodies; (e) the Parliament and the
legislative assemblies of the Autonomous Regions.
46. Art. 119 of the Spanish Constitution establishes that, pursuant to the
corresponding law, those without enough resources to litigate must
have legal aid. This fundamental right has been legally developed by
the abovementioned Law 1/1996 on Legal Aid, amended by the said
Royal Decree Law 3/2013, modifying the system of fees in the frame-
work of the justice administration and the system of legal aid. Last
amendment was undertaken by Law 42/2015 of 5 October.
47. Chapter VIII of the Law 1/1996 transposes into Spanish law Council
Directive 2002/8/EC, of 27 January 2003, to improve access to justice
in cross-border disputes by establishing minimum common rules relating
to legal aid for such disputes.
48. See Art. 3 of the Law 1/1996.
49. The exact amount is available at the following webpage: <www. iprem.
com. es/>. A distinction is made between a monthly public revenue
index or IPREM (532.31 €), a 12-month IPREM (6,390.13 €), and a 14-
month IPREM (7,455.14 €).
ces exceed the abovementioned maximum and hence are
not eligible for coverage, but whose personal circum-
stances make it advisable to granting them legal aid,
provided that they do not earn more than five times the
public revenue index.
The system is financed by the State, but carried out by
the bar associations, and their General Council, the
CGAE, regularly publishes statistics on the functioning
of the system.50 In 2012, 232 mill.€ were invested in the
system, meaning this figure a reduction of a 8.7% in
respect to 2011 (254.5 mill. €). In 2010 (256 mill. €) the
reduction was of 4% in regard to 2009 (266 mill. €).
Data from the year 2013 indicate that investment in
legal aid continues to decrease in another 4%, i.e. 223.5
mill. €.51 It must be noted that the reduction has mainly
affected payments to lawyers to the extent that they
have taken a between 5 and 10% pay cut depending on
the Comunidad Autónoma.52 In contrast, the investment
in the system has been increased a 1.5% in 2014 (226.9
mill.€) as a result of the widening of litigants with right
to legal aid following the introduction of court fees and
their impact on access to justice.53 So, all that can be
said is that the trend towards a declining investment has
been just simply slowed down.
4.2 The Impact of Austerity on the Behaviour of
Litigants: The Resorting to Self-Defence
Mechanisms in Light of the Non-Efficient
State Action
In recent years there has been a dramatic increase in the
number of court cases, in particular of those related to
insolvency and debt collection cases.54 The point to be
made now is that, unfortunately, the Spanish civil jus-
tice system did not provide families in difficulties for
alternatives and led them to situations of social exclu-
sion. In view of lack of State support, citizens have been
50. The following figures can be found in the studies provided by the CGAE
<www. abogacia. es/ wp -content/ uploads/ 2013/ 07/ VII -Observatorio -
Justicia -Gratuita. pdf> and <www. abogacia. es/ wp -content/ uploads/
2014/ 07/ IX -Observatorio -Justicia -Gratuita -y -portada. pdf>.
51. See VIII Informe del Observatorio de Justicia Gratuita. Abogacía Espa-
ñola-LA LEY. Estadística completa 2010-2013, available at <www.
abogacia. es/ repositorio/ viii_ observatorio_ justicia_ gratuita/ offline/
download. pdf>.
52. Although those payments were not already high as a lawyer receives
around 125 € per file.
53. The same CGAE reports inform that applications for legal aid have sig-
nificantly increased in 2014 and 2013: 969,775 and 950,000 applica-
tions were respectively filed those years while the figure was 800,000 in
2012. The explanation to this rise can be found in the introduction of
significant court fees in Spain in 2013. It has boosted the said number
of applications, in particular in those claims against public administra-
tions where the applications in 2013 raised a 54% in relation to the pre-
vious year; in civil matters, the increase was of 16% in the same period
of time. Figures are similar in 2014. All in all, 1,770,000 cases were han-
dled within this system in 2013 and 1,765,000 in 2014. To understand
such figures account should be given to the fact that those granted
legal aid may give rise to different files, from proceedings in first
instance to challenges, etc.
54. Again, data on the crisis and courts’ workload from 2007 to the begin-
ning of 2015 can be downloaded from the CGPJ webpage <www.
poderjudicial. es/ cgpj/ es/ Temas/ Estadistica -Judicial/ Informes -estadisticos
-periodicos>. It provides information on number of enforcement, insol-
vency and payment proceedings, as well as those related to mortgages
or evictions.
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organising themselves in platforms of people affected by
mortgages.55 These platforms provide legal advice and
counselling, but also support to those families whose sit-
uation is that of becoming homeless. Remarkably, they
have openly resorted to illegal occupation of buildings to
provide households accommodation. The legal situation
has slightly improved, but Spain is still far away from
complying with citizens’ expectations, for which reason
many people still depend on these platforms to get shel-
ter.
The Government has only reacted to the eviction prob-
lem after a 2013 judgment of the Court of Justice of the
European Union condemning Spain,56 by issuing imme-
diately after a law adopting some measures to mitigate
the situation of debtors in difficulty of paying back the
mortgage over their home.57 This law allows the imme-
diate suspension and for a 2-year-period, of evictions of
those families in ‘situation of special risk of social exclu-
sion’, and provides for a limitation on the interest rate in
case of late payments. However, this is an exceptional
and temporal measure which does not interfere with
mortgage enforcement proceedings, and it is only availa-
ble for numerous families or families made of an only
parent with at least two children, for those with a 3-
year-old minor or some disabled or dependent mem-
bers, for unemployed debtors and deprived of any social
benefit, or for victims of gender violence. Along with
further requirements, their income must not exceed
three times the public revenue index, and the significant
difficulties must have begun at least 4 years before the
claim for suspension of eviction.
As to the proceeding, the said 2013 law specifically lays
down the obligation of judges and notaries – the latter,
when extra-judicially selling out the house – of examin-
ing ex officio the existence of unfair terms in the contract
of mortgage. This modification has been adopted fol-
lowing the CJEU case law in its judgment of 14 March
2013,58 specifically addressing a prejudicial question
posed by the Commercial court No. 3 of Barcelona as
regards to Directive 93/13/EEC.59 The CJEU rules out
inter alia that the Directive
must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a
Member State, such as that at issue in the main pro-
ceedings, which, while not providing in mortgage
enforcement proceedings for grounds of objection
based on the unfairness of a contractual term on
which the right to seek enforcement is based, does
not allow the court before which declaratory proceed-
ings have been brought, which does have jurisdiction
to assess whether such a term is unfair, to grant inter-
55. See Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca <http:// afectadosporla
hipoteca. com/>.
56. Case 415/11, Mohamed Aziz v. Caixa d’Estalvis de Catalunya, Tarrago-
na i Manresa (Catalunyacaixa), [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:164.
57. See Ley 1/2013, de 14 de mayo, de medidas para reforzar la protección
a los deudores hipotecarios, reestructuración de deuda y alquiler social
(BOE No. 116, 15.5.2013).
58. Case 415/11, above n. 56.
59. See Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in
consumer contracts [1993] OJ L 95/29.
im relief, including, in particular, the staying of those
enforcement proceedings, where the grant of such
relief is necessary to guarantee the full effectiveness
of its final decision.
This judgment has been largely celebrated in Spain to
the extent that it has helped to unveil significant abuses
in mortgage contracts that were being executed or bur-
den household economies. Yet, mortgage realisations go
on and consist of the selling out of the house, many
times for a prize under the debt. For this reason the
2013 law opens the way to a writing of a part of the debt
in exchange for certain payments and the mechanisms of
bidding and auction have been improved to facilitate the
participation of bidders.
Despite its rhetoric, the 2013 law is too restrictive and
timid when addressing this important social problem.
For example, and despite the clear CJEU’s case law, it
established a time limit to claim that the mortgage con-
tract contains unfair terms, for which reason it was chal-
lenged before the CJEU which concluded that this is
contrary to Directive 93/13/CEE.60 For this and other
reasons, the 2013 law has been amended in 2015.61
Noteworthy is that debtors over sixty are now consid-
ered especially vulnerable62 and a small increase in the
maximum income under which families would be inclu-
ded in the scope of this law has been done, by taking
into consideration the public revenue index of fourteen
salaries.63 Yet, amendments are not relevant and they
will not increase the (small) number of beneficiaries.64
Against this background, it was particularly striking that
natural persons were not able to resort to insolvency law
to overcome their economic problems; while the Span-
ish Insolvency Act did not distinguish between debtors
and thus it is applicable to everyone, proceedings’ costs
made it impossible for small debtors to take advantage of
it, thereby social exclusion and the resorting to informal
economy were the only alternatives for many professio-
nals and private persons. On account of the new
approach to failure promoted by the European Union,65
the Spanish Insolvency Act has been finally amended to
make it possible a second chance for natural persons,
including consumers.66 The terms in which the debt
discharge is laid down are not the most favourable, but
60. Case C-169/14, Sánchez Morcillo and Abril García [2014] ECLI:EU:C:
2014:2099.
61. In particular, by Royal Decree 1/2015, 27 February.
62. See Art. 1 of Law 1/2013 laying down the concept of ‘person especially
vulnerable’.
63. In detail, see Art. 1(3) of Law 1/2013.
64. The same law has also been amended with a view to taking into
account the many judgments in Spain declaring many mortgage con-
tract terms unfair. In this regard, it must be mentioned that Directive
2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 Febru-
ary 2014 on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential
immovable property and amending Directives 2008/48/EC and
2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 [2014] OJ L 60/34)
has not been transposed in Spain yet.
65. See, e.g. Commission Recommendation of 12 March 2014 on a new
approach to business failure and insolvency [C(2014) 1500 final].
66. See in particular, Art. 178bis LC.
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Improve the Civil Judicial
System
5.1 Mediation
Spain has joined the global trend towards favouring
mediation and other alternative dispute resolution
methods to the extent that they seem to be a good alter-
native to an increasingly impoverished and expensive
judicial system.67 ADR methods were, of course, not
strange to the Spanish legal system,68 but it cannot be
said that they had been successful. For example, a con-
ciliation proceeding was introduced in 1996, to be fol-
lowed before the civil proceeding and conducted by the
seized judge acting thus as a conciliator.69 What hap-
pened is that the judge was in general not present in the
conciliation hearing and the intervention of the appli-
cant for conciliation was limited to explain the facts ask-
ing the other party to admit them. As the latter did not
do it, the formality of having attempted conciliation was
deemed to be satisfied, and therefore, the opening of
civil proceedings proceeded.70 Not surprisingly, judicial
settlements were also and still are a rara avis in Spain,
although the lawyers’ role as social mediators, i.e. help-
ing clients to avoid litigation, must be highlighted
here.71 The point to be made is that, on the one hand,
parties’ transaction is difficult to achieve once the stage
of litigation has been reached, while on the other hand,
members of the judiciary are not fully convinced that
they have a role to play when it comes to ADR methods.
Nevertheless, the costs of the justice system along with
the international move towards ADR methods brought
to the forefront the need of convincing Spanish society
67. See Kramer and Kakiuchi, above n. 4, at 49-50.
68. An embryo of mandatory conciliation was already mentioned in Art.
282 of the 1812 Constitution of Cádiz for civil lawsuits and slander
cases, available at <www. congreso. es/ portal/ page/ portal/ Congreso/
Congreso/ Hist_ Normas/ ConstEsp1812_ 1978/ Const1812>.
69. See Arts 460 ff. of the Royal Decree of 3 February 1881 issuing the Ley
de Enjuiciamiento Civil (Gaceta 5 February 1881).
70. J. Nieva Fenoll, Derecho procesal II: Proceso civil (2015) at 121.
71. According to a survey conducted by the CGAE in 2008, only 60% of
cases actually reach the courts. See ‘La Abogacía española en datos y
cifras 2008’, at 146-7 and at 161. Available at <www. cgae. es/
portalCGAE/ archivos/ ficheros/ 1225374383601. pdf>.
to turn to these mechanisms.72 In this regard, Directive
2008/52/EC of European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil, of 21 May 2008, on certain aspects of mediation in
civil and commercial matters,73 speeded up this process,
and in addition to a law transposing it,74 other laws have
been amended to encourage the resorting to mediation.
In particular, the LEC was amended to make courts
inform parties to the proceedings that they have the
path of mediation open.75 In a similar vein, the above-
mentioned conciliation proceeding has been abolished
and a new one established to which parties may resort
prior to the beginning of the judicial process.76 Media-
tion is also possible in the course of judicial proceedings,
but the judge has in this case a passive role.77
All these legal changes along with the political will and
an intense academic debate have clearly given a boost to
mediation in Spain, but only in terms of legislation and
in offers of training courses for mediators. In order to
become a mediator, a specific training is compulsory for
which reason many institutions, in particular universi-
ties and bar associations, have provided for it and almost
every lawyer and other professionals have been qualified
as mediators.78 As said, legal reforms have made courts
advise mediation and specific programs have been estab-
lished to fulfil this obligation. As a result, figures on
mediation in family matters have been relatively
improved.79 As to other matters and save the case of
ADR methods in labour matters, there are not reliable
72. In 2008, a plan to modernise the justice administration was approved
by the CGPJ including civil and criminal mediation as part of it. See Plan
de Modernización de la Justicia available at <www. poderjudicial. es/
cgpj/ es/ Temas/ Modernizacion -de -la -Justicia/ El -Plan -de -Modernizacion
-de -la -Justicia>. See S. Barona Vilar, Mediación en asuntos civiles y
mercantiles en España. Tras la aprobación de la Ley 5/2012, de 6 de
julio (2013), at 51 and at 76, on further manifestations of mediation in
Spain, including legislation issued by the regional Parliaments of the
Spanish Comunidades Autónomas and sector-oriented mediation pro-
cess conducted by Ombudsmen, e.g. in insurance or education matters.
73. OJ [2008] L 136/3. In the same vein, see Directive 2013/11/EU of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on alternative
dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC)
No. 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC, OJ [2013] L 165/63 and
Regulation (EU) 524/2013 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 21 May 2013 on online dispute resolution for consumer dis-
putes and amending Regulation (EC) 2006/2004 and Directive
2009/22/EC (Regulation on consumer ODR), OJ [2013] L 165/1.
74. See Ley 5/2012, de 6 de julio, de mediación en asuntos civiles y mer-
cantiles (BOE No. 162, 7.7.2012).
75. See Arts. 414(1), 440(1), 443(3) LEC.
76. See Arts. 139-148 of Law 15/2015.
77. See Art. 415 LEC. The difference between conciliation and mediation is
in Spain as blurred as in other countries. See J. Nieva Fenoll, ‘La media-
zione: un’alternativa ragionevole al processo?’, 67 Rivista Trimestrale
Di Diritto e Procedura Civile 1327, at 1329-1332 (2013), who also
emphasises the non-convenience of naming conciliator the very same
judge to decide on the case, but a different one on account of their
auctoritas reinforcing their persuasion ability. Ibid., at 1336-1339.
78. On the significant of mediators’ education, see ibid., at 1332-1336.
79. According to data provided by the CGPJ on mediations undertaken in
the course of family proceedings in 2014, family courts have referred to
mediation 6,101 cases, 1,379 were mediated and 598 ended up in set-
tlement while 781 not. See ‘Mediación intrajudicial en España 2014’,
available at <www. poderjudicial. es/ cgpj/ es/ Temas/ Mediacion/ Datos -
estadisticos/ Mediacion -intrajudicial -en -Espana - -datos -2014>.
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data,80 but the reality seems not to be as good as expec-
ted by all the fuss around mediation.81 For it is true that
much has to be improved, there are also justified wor-
ries that it will only serve to increase the length of the
procedure.
5.2 Consumer Arbitration
Consumers’ access to justice is an issue that highly pre-
occupies modern democracies to the extent that their
claims are usually of such a low value that it is not worth
litigating. Yet, should consumer rights remain
unclaimed, unfair competition issues would arise and
consumer diffidence would impair the correct function-
ing of the market. Against this background, several
techniques have been resorted to with a view to facilitat-
ing consumers’ access to justice, including ADR meth-
ods. Spain is not an exception, although its system can
only be understood in the framework of EU law.
As known, the European Union has been especially
active in consumer law. For our purposes Council
Directive 93/13/ECC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms
in consumer contracts is to be again mentioned to the
extent that it lays down that arbitration agreements
included in this type of contracts are to be considered
null and void unless covered by legal provisions.82 As a
matter of fact, the establishment of an administrative
system of consumer arbitration by the Government was
already planned in 1984,83 but it was only set up in
1993.84
80. The study ‘Rebooting the Mediation Directive: assessing the limited
impact of its implementation and proposing measures to increase the
number of mediations in the EU’, prepared in 2014 by the Directorate-
General for Internal Affairs, European Commission, and available at
<www. europarl. europa. eu/ RegData/ etudes/ etudes/ join/ 2014/ 493042/
IPOL -JURI_ ET%282014%29493042_ EN. pdf>, is quite clear in this
respect: mediation in civil and commercial matters has been used only in
less than 1% of the cases in the EU. In Spain, from 500 to 2,000 media-
tions have been estimated per year. See ibid., at 6, Figure B.
81. See an overview of mediation’s pros and cons in S. Barona Vilar, ‘Inte-
gración de la mediación en el moderno concepto de Access to Justice.
Luces y sombras en Europa’, InDret 1 (2014), available at <www. indret.
com/ pdf/ 1092. pdf>.
82. Annex to Directive 93/13/ECC includes within the terms referred to in
Art. 3(3)1, i.e. those that are null and void, terms ‘(q) excluding or hin-
dering the consumer’s right to take legal action or exercise any other
legal remedy, particularly by requiring the consumer to take disputes
exclusively to arbitration not covered by legal provisions, unduly
restricting the evidence available to him or imposing on him a burden of
proof which, according to the applicable law, should lie with another
party to the contract’.
83. Consumer protection is to be pursued by any state institution or private
person in Spain, pursuant to Art. 51 of the Spanish Constitution.
Against this background, Art. 31 of the Ley 26/1984, de 19 de julio,
general para la defensa de los consumidores y usuarios laid down the
Government’s obligation to set up an arbitration system taking into
account any interested party’s opinions, in particular those of consumer
associations.
84. The Consumer Arbitration System was set up by Royal Decree
636/1993 of 3 May 1993, now substituted by Royal Decree 231/2008
of 15 February. The Spanish Government was entitled to issue the latter
by Law 44/2006, of 29 December. Other relevant rules are Arts. 57 and
58 of Legislative Royal Decree 1/2007 of 16 November, approving a
text refunding the General Law on the Defence of Consumers and
Users and other supplementary laws, as well as Law 60/2003, of 23
December, on arbitration.
The consumer arbitration system only applies to con-
sumer matters and disputes between professionals or
businesses and consumers setting aside those cases deal-
ing with intoxication, injury, or death or that show rea-
sonable indications of a criminal offence.85 Consumer
Arbitration Boards, the Commission of Consumer Arbi-
tration Boards, the General Council, and arbitration tri-
bunals are the bodies of the system. The main body are
consumer arbitration boards which are in charge of
managing the system and providing administrative and
technical services to arbitrators and parties to arbitra-
tion. In addition to the National Consumer Arbitration
Board, local boards can be established depending on the
relevant public administration. Only consumers are
entitled to request for arbitration before any consumer
arbitration board agreed between the parties to arbitra-
tion; in default, the local board corresponding to the
consumer’s domicile is the one competent to administer
the arbitration.86 Should a request (not) be admitted to
arbitration, the decision can be challenged before the
Commission of Consumer Arbitration Boards.87 The
Commission is also in charge of issuing guidelines and
reports with a view to coordinating arbitrators and
avoiding contradictions. Anyway, the principles of inde-
pendence and impartiality govern arbitrators’ actuations
meaning that arbitrators are entitled not to apply the
said guidelines as long as they explain their reasons. In
general, arbitrators have to comply specific require-
ments and show qualifications as requested by the Gen-
eral Council.88
Consumer arbitration proceeds on an equity basis unless
the parties require it to be in law,89 is meant to have a
length of 6 months maximum,90 and is free from costs.
Access to arbitration proceeds on a voluntary basis, but
acceptance can be provided in different moments
depending on whether the party to arbitration is a busi-
ness or a consumer, to the extent that businesses may
join ex ante the system in order to arbitrate all or some
disputes arising from their trade;91 in this case, consum-
ers only need to file a request for arbitration. Of course,
acceptance can be also provided on ad hoc basis, by an
arbitration agreement included in the consumer con-
85. See Arts. 57(1) of Law 44/2006 and 2(2) of Royal Decree 231/2007.
86. In case of several consumer arbitration boards covering the same terri-
tory, the smallest one is deemed to be competent. Should a territorial
limitation be included in the public adhesion to the system issued by the
relevant business, the consumer arbitration board to which the business
submits is the one competent unless it has submitted to several boards
in which case the consumer has a choice. See Art 8 of Royal Decree
231/2008.
87. Ibid., Art. 11(1).
88. Compliance of requirements and qualifications is monitored by the pres-
ident of the relevant consumer arbitration board. See ibid., Art. 17.
89. Should arbitration be in law, all arbitrators have to be law graduates.
Otherwise, this requirement is only applicable to those arbitrators stem-
ming from the public administration. Arbitrations tribunals can be made
of one or three arbitrators; in this case one stems from the public
administration while the other ones act on behalf of consumer associa-
tions and business organisations. See ibid., Art. 21.
90. Ibid., Art. 49.
91. Ibid., Arts. 25 and 26.
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tract, independently subscribed or even by request of
arbitration followed by other party’s acceptance.92
The advantage of an ex ante adhesion to the system is
that businesses are allowed to display a distinctive sign
indicating that they have joined the consumer arbitra-
tion system.93 In a similar vein, a public registry of busi-
nesses entering into the system has been set up under
the supervision of the Spanish Agency of Consumption,
Food Security and Nutrition, in order to make this
information available to any interested party.94 So, any
consumer trading with one of these businesses may rely
on the latter’s availability to reach a prompt solution to
any issue arising between both parties; thereby business-
es’ reputation is enhanced by this means. In general, the
system has been a success. But there is one significant
issue though and concerns its voluntary character, i.e. it
is up to businesses to join the system and although
adhesion figures are very high, the same applies to busi-
nesses abandoning the system.95
5.3 Collective Actions
While Spain was one of the first countries in the Euro-
pean Union in addressing collective actions, the first
rules dealing with them dating back to mid-1980s,96
Directive 98/27/EC on injunctions for the protection of
consumers’ interests, now replaced by Directive
2009/22/EC,97 made them more visible. However,
Spanish rules on collective actions have been issued not
systematically but on a piecemeal basis to the extent that
almost each consumer directive laid down a rule on col-
lective action and so each Spanish law transposing them
did.98 The LEC also addresses collective actions, but it
has not finishes fragmentation. As a matter of fact, there
is fragmentation even within the LEC where several
provisions scattered across the act deal with only some
issues of collective proceedings. Against this back-
ground, only some collective cases have made their way
to courts in the last 30 years, mostly injunctive actions;
despite having been legally addressed in Spain, redress
collective actions are rare in practice due to their costs
92. Ibid., Art. 24.
93. Ibid., Art. 28.
94. Ibid., Art. 33. The registry is supposed to be available online, but they
are still working on it. See Agency of Consumption, Food Security and
Nutrition <http:// arbitrajedeconsumo. mspsi. es/ avisoBuscadorEmpresas.
html>.
95. Unfortunately current data are not available at the webpage of the
Spanish Agency of Consumption, Food Security and Nutrition. Last data
available at <http:// consumo -inc. gob. es/ arbitraje/ memoria. htm> go
back to 2007, when there were 61,759 consumer arbitrations. Note-
worthy is that consumer arbitration is mostly resorted to in telecommu-
nications, education, and energy matters, while other sectors do not
take advantage of it mainly due to the lack of businesses’ cooperation.
96. The already mentioned Law 26/1984 on the protection of consumers
and users laid down the embryo of collective actions, as Art. 7 LOPJ
did.
97. Directive 2009/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
23 April 2009 on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interests
replacing the Directive 1998/27/EC, OJ 2009 L 110/51.
98. See M. Carballo Fidalgo, La protección del consumidor frente a las
cláusulas no negociadas individualmente. Disciplina legal y tratamiento
jurisprudencial de las cláusulas abusivas (2013) at 243; L. Carballo
Piñeiro, ‘La tipicidad de las acciones colectivas en el ordenamiento jurí-
dico español’, Justicia. Revista de derecho procesal 63 (2007).
and difficulties first in legally understanding what is
necessary to proceed and second in gathering group
members, evidence, and administering enforcement in
case the action is successful.99
Standing is a key issue and each Spanish consumer law
laying down some sort of collective action deals with it,
e.g. it makes injunctive and/or redress collective actions
available to claim for the rights therein enshrined specif-
ically establishing who has standing to bring them
before court, usually some legal entities such as the Pub-
lic Ministry or those state institutions in charge of pro-
tecting consumers, as well as consumer associations and
business organisations. Nothing else is said about the
procedure. Further specifications have to be found in
the LEC which also has rule on standing. Pursuant to
Article 11 LEC, only state entities and consumer associ-
ations are entitled to bring injunctive actions (i.e. those
claiming general or diffuse interests) before courts,
while in addition to those entities and associations,
groups may also commence redress collective actions.
However, the latter is far from usual and the rule is that
consumer associations take the lead in conducting any
kind of collective action. In view of the role these associ-
ations play in practice, they are granted legal aid,100 but
it does not cover all costs, e.g. of gathering group mem-
bers and informing them about the action. Notice to
group members depends on the type of the collective
action and varies from the court clerk informing of the
action via mass media to the representative claimant
being obliged to locate the group and inform each mem-
ber of its intention to undertake the collective action
even before bringing it to court.101 The latter is difficult
and expensive, but the claimant may get court help to
determine the group.102 Further uncertainties arise from
the fact that the LEC simply indicates what happens if
group members join the action during the proceeding,
but says nothing about their right to opt in or to opt
out.103 Accordingly, it is unclear who is bound by the
final judgment although the LEC does acknowledge at
least the ultra partes effect of this type of actions.104 In
the same vein, LEC does not lay down a certification
99. The very first issue was already conceptualising collective and group
interests. See L Bujosa Vadell, La protección jurisdiccional de los intere-
ses de grupo (1995); P. Gutiérrez de Cabiedes e Hidalgo de Cabiedes,
La tutela jurisdiccional de los intereses supraindividuales:colectivos y
difusos (1999).
100. See Art. 37(d) of Real Decreto Legislativo 1/2007, de 16 de noviembre,
por el que se aprueba el texto refundido de la Ley General para la
Defensa de los Consumidores y Usuarios y otras leyes complementa-
rias.
101. See Art. 15 LEC. There is no notice though in case of injunctive actions.
102. Ibid., Art. 256(1)(6). However, this provision has been strictly interpre-
ted in order to balance the right to get information about the group
from the respondent and the right to data protection to which the latter
is obliged. See the Constitutional Court’s judgement 96/2012 of 7 May.
103. Although the general interpretation is that it must be an opt-out sys-
tem. See L. Carballo Piñeiro, Las acciones colectivas y su eficacia extra-
territorial. Problemas de recepción y trasplante de las class actions en
Europa (2009) 53.
104. See Art. 222(3) LEC. Art. 221 LEC also addresses this issue but only in
the event that the representative claimant is a consumer association. As
this is the usual case, this provision is the key one when it comes to the
binding effect of collective proceedings.
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phase or address judicial settlements in collective
actions for which reason they are not feasible.105
All these issues make it difficult the commencement of
collective actions. But the economic downturn has made
them more interesting and an increase in their practice
can be traced.106 A good example is the judgment No.
213/2013, of 9 May 2013, by which the Supreme Court
ruled that stipulating a minimum interest rate – i.e.
should indicators go down that rate, the mortgagor still
has to pay the minimum contractually agreed in mort-
gage contracts – are null and void due to their unfair
nature. However, account should be given of the exis-
tence of a request for a preliminary ruling before the
CJEU stemming from a collective action brought in
2010 before a commercial court in Madrid by a consum-
er association and involving 101 banks for using those
terms;107 in view of the length of the procedure, many
consumers decided to individually claim, but the
defendants have been applying for a stay on the grounds
that the judgment to be rendered in the collective action
is a preliminary issue in relation to those individual
claims.108 Against this background, a commercial court
in Barcelona decided to ask the CJEU whether such a
rule is consistent with EU consumer protection arguing
that ‘the consumer is bound by the decision in those
[collective] proceedings without having had the oppor-
tunity to put forward the appropriate pleas or adduce
evidence with full equality of arms’.109 In other words,
the inconsistencies and gaps of the Spanish legislation as
well as the length of procedures seem to be hampering
105. See L. Carballo Piñeiro, above n. 103, at 211-22. Seeking for alterna-
tives see F. Gascón Inchausti, Tutela judicial de los consumidores y
transacciones colectivas (2010).
106. The rise on collective actions also involve foreign companies as evi-
denced by cases Costa Cruceros (Juzgado de lo Mercantil No. 1,
Madrid, 23 October 2012) and Ryanair (Juzgado de lo Mercantil No. 5,
Madrid, 30 September 2013; Tribunal Superior de Justicia Madrid
765/2013, 30 October 2013), both discussed in L. Carballo Piñeiro, ‘La
construcción del mercado interior y el recurso colectivo de consumi-
dores’, in F. Esteban de la Rosa (ed.), La protección del consumidor en
dos espacios de integración: Europa y América. Una perspectiva de
Derecho internacional, europeo y comparado (2015), at 1055-1088.
107. The collective action is being handled by the Juzgado de lo Mercantil
No. 11, Madrid, juicio verbal No. 471/2010, involving 15,000 consum-
ers represented by the consumer association ADICAE, although the key
issue for such a delay lies in the 101 defendants.
108. The European Central Bank has set the interest rate at which it lends
money to commercial banks very low, but Spanish mortgagors are not
taking advantage of it due to the so-called floor clauses, the abovemen-
tioned minimum interest rates included by banks in mortgage contracts.
That is the reason why many consumers do not want to wait for the
judgment in the collective action, because they have to comply with the
actual terms of the contract, including those whose nullity is being
requested. To make the situation even more complicated, the above-
mentioned Supreme Court’s judgment of 2013 ruled out that those
terms were null and void but argued that such a declaration only had ex
nunc effects, i.e. terms must be removed from contracts, but banks do
not have to give back the money already collected on their account.
The Supreme Court changed this doctrine in its judgment No.
139/2015 of 9 March and clarified that banks do have to give back the
money already collected but only from the 9 May 2013.
109. See Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de lo Mercantil
No. 9, Barcelona (Spain) lodged on 11 August 2014, Jorge Sales Sinués
v. Caixabank, S.A. (Case C-381/14).
access to justice and putting into question the role of
collective actions in a democratic society.
6 Final Remarks
The economic downturn has struck the Spanish judicia-
ry on both the supply and the demand sides of justice
services, to the extent that it has undergone a severe
budget restriction and had to confront the huge social
conflict arising from it. Further austerity measures have
deepened social conflict by hampering access to justice
while first establishing high court fees and second
severely curtailing legal aid’s budget. Furthermore, the
Spanish legal system was not ready to provide support
to debtor natural persons in difficulties, and the judicia-
ry has been made responsible for being just the mouth
that pronounces the words of law. Alternatives to the
traditional way of handling cases have been put in
motion, but they do not seem to go beyond dealing with
a few cases (and maybe it is not necessary to go further).
Without questioning the need of a holistic approach to
the justice system, the role of judge-made justice in a
democratic society has to be vindicated, and if one con-
clusion can be drawn from the financial crisis is that the
disregarding of such a role can be dangerous and fatal
for social cohesion.
184
ELR December 2015 | No. 4 - doi: 10.5553/ELR.000049
